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The Availability of Jury Trials in Copyright Infringement 
Cases: Limiting the Scope of the Seventh Amendment 
One of the objectives of the architects of modem pleading, 1 and an 
oft-expressed goal of legal scholars, 2 has been the elimination of the 
historical dichotomy between law and equity. The "merger" of the 
two ancient legal branches remains incomplete, 3 however, in large part 
because of the seventh amendment's mandate that "in suits at com-
mon law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."4 The 
amendment has been construed as providing the right to a jury trial in 
all civil cases considered to be "at law" at the time of the Constitu-
tion's adoption, but as denying this right in all cases considered "in 
equity" at that time. 5 Thus, the equitable/legal distinction retains 
great importance in civil cases in which the right to jury trial is at 
issue. 
The problems of characterization and historical analysis involved 
in deciding whether a particular cause of action is legal or equitable 
are compounded when the legislature· creates new causes of action. 
Statutory remedies created after the adoption of the seventh amend-
ment would seem to fall outside the amendment's stricture that the 
right to trial by jury shall be "preserved." However, the Supreme 
Court has held that a newly created statutory cause of action will 
carry with it the right to a jury trial if it can be properly characterized 
as "legal" in nature. 6 Thus, the question of whether a modem statu-
tory cause of action entitles the parties to a jury trial often becomes 
one of whether the most closely analogous cause of action existing at 
the time of the Constitution's adoption in 1791 would have been char-
1. The first system of code pleading, New York's Field Code, eliminated "the distinction 
between actions at law, and suits in equity" and established one form of action, "which shall be 
denominated a civil action." E. STASON, B. SHARTEL, & J. REED, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
EQUITY 89 (1953) [hereinafter cited as E. STASON]. This policy was adopted by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Id. 
2. See notes 132-35 infra and accompanying text. 
3. E. STASON, supra note 1, at 90. 
4. In its entirety, the amendment reads: "In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by 
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law." U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. 
5. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) ("The phrase 'common law,' found in 
[the seventh amendment], is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime 
jurisprudence."). 
6. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to 
actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates 
legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."). 
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acterized as "legal" or "equitable."7 
Cases brought pursuant to the federal copyright statute8 present 
current examples of the characterization problem posed by newly cre-
ated causes of action. Because it is frequently difficult for the plaintiff 
in a copyright case to prove the exact amount of his or her loss,9 the 
copyright statute gives the plaintiff the option of suing for "statutory" 
instead of "actual" damages.10 Under the "statutory" damages provi-
sion, the plaintiff need not present any showing of actual loss; 11 the 
court is given authority to award as damages any amount it considers 
"just," between the limits of $250 and $10,000.12 The copyright stat-
ute engenders little dispute when the plaintiff chooses to pursue actual 
damages, which are easily characterized as a legal remedy.13 The stat-
utory damages remedy, however, escapes such neat classification, for it 
combines elements characteristic of both legal and equitable 
remedies. 14 
This Note addresses the question of whether the statutory damages 
remedy provided by the federal copyright statute is properly charac-
terized as equitable or as legal, and consequently whether the remedy 
falls within the seventh amendment's jury trial provision. Courts15 
and commentators16 disagree about the answers to these questions. 
Those who describe the statutory relief as "legal" point out that sec-
tion 504( c) monetary damages are analogous to other forms of mone-
tary relief, such as debt, which are legal in nature,17 and that the 
7. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the I"ationality of Rational 
Decision Making, 10 Nw. U. L. REV. 486, 490-91 (1975). 
8. Copyrights Act of 1976, §§ 101-810, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). 
9. For example, how much money has a plaintiff "lost" if a band infringes his or her copy-
right in a musical work by playing the work as one of many pieces performed at a concert? See 
generally Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1894) (noting difficulty of determining amount of 
loss caused by copyright infringement in many cases). 
10. See text at note 25 infra. 
11. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 118 (4th Cir. 1981); Broadcast Music, Inc. 
v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 CoPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1{ 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976). 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). Section 504(c)(2) raises the damages ceiling for willful 
infringement and lowers the damages floor for unknowing infringement. 
13. See note 79 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See notes 86-115 infra and accompanying text. 
15. Compare Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (section 504(c) 
relief held legal in nature), with Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(section 504(c) relief to be determined by judge), and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 
645 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (section 504(c) relief held to be equitable). 
16. Compare Patry, The Right to a Jury in Copyright Cases, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SocY. 139 
(1981) (advancing the thesis that statutory copyright damages are legal), with 3 NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON CoPYRIGHT § 14.04[C] (1985) (proposing as "perhaps the better view" that § 504(c) 
damages should be awarded by the judge). Other commentary on the question of jury trials in 
copyright cases includes: Breuninger, Statutory Damages and Right to Jury Trial in Copyright 
Infringement Suits, 24 IDEA 249 (1984); Note, Right to a Jury Trial Under Copyright Act's Statu-
tory Damage Provision, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 800 (1982). 
17. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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action's statutory predecessors have historically been considered 
legal. 18 Their opponents argue that the large amount of discretion al-
lowed in fixing the level of damages19 and the "calculation" of dam-
ages without regard to "facts" (the usual province of juries) indicate 
that the relief was intended to be and should be described as 
"equitable."20 
This Note argues that statutory copyright damages are properly 
regarded as equitable and hence that no right to a jury trial exists in 
cases brought to recover such damages. More generally, the Note 
maintains that the seventh amendment's distinction between equitable 
and legal causes of action has produced irrational consequences, and 
proposes that "legal" issues be defined narrowly so as to limit the 
scope of the seventh amendment. Part I analyzes the debate over stat-
utory copyright damages, concluding that historical and statutory 
construction arguments require these damages to be construed as 
legal. Part II examines some of the problems that have resulted from 
traditional interpretations of the seventh amendment, and argues that 
these problems would be ameliorated by classifying ambiguous causes 
of action, such as statutory copyright damages, as equitable relief. 
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STATUTORY DAMAGES REMEDY: 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND HISTORICAL .ANALYSIS 
In Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 21 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit found that statutory damages under federal copyright 
law constituted legal damages, and thus that the defendant was within 
his rights in demanding a jury trial.22 In so holding, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stands alone among the five circuits that have considered the is-
sue. 23 The disagreement among the circuits extends to both issues 
18. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981); Patry, supra note 16, 
at 147-94. 
19. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1957), 
20. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC, (CCH) 
1125,059 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
21. 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981). 
22. 653 F.2d at 120-21. 
23. Reaching results opposite to that of Gnossos were Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 
1983) (per curiam); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 
1977); and Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957). The last two cases 
interpreted the statutory damages provision of the 1909 Copyright Act, which was identical, for 
present purposes, to the statutory damages provision of the 1976 Act. 
Unfortunately, none of the Courts of Appeals that held statutory copyright relief to be equita-
ble devoted any appreciable analysis to the question. The Oboler court simply stated its conclu-
sion without precedential support or elaboration. 714 F.2d at 213. The Fifth Circuit in Frith 
confined its analysis to a list of citations of cases on both sides, concluding simply that the 
"whole case is equitable." 645 F.2d at 7. The Ninth Circuit based its decision in Sid & Marty 
Krofft entirely on the statute's use of the word "court," 562 F.2d at 1177, which the Supreme 
Court has found, in another context, to be an improper basis for decision. See notes 27-30 infra 
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raised by the attempt to characterize statutory copyright damages: 
first, whether Congress meant to provide for trial by jury in statutory 
damage cases; and second, whether the seventh amendment requires 
that a jury be provided, irrespective of congressional intent. 24 
A. Statutory Construction 
Section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyrights Act, which provides for 
"statutory" relief, reads in pertinent part: 
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is 
rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of 
statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than $250 or more than 
$10,000 as the court considers just.25 
Courts and commentators on both sides of the legal/ equitable debate 
have attempted to construe the language and intent of section 504(c) 
to their advantage. In the final analysis, however, the debate over stat-
utory construction remains unresolved. 
Several courts have focused on the use of the word "court" in sec-
tion 504(c), concluding that Congress intended the issue of statutory 
relief to be tried before a judge. 26 In Gnossos, however, the Fourth 
Circuit found such reasoning unpersuasive. The Gnossos court cited a 
Supreme Court decision27 in which a statutory remedy28 directed by 
Congress to be administered by the "court" was nonetheless held legal 
in nature.29 The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that the word "court" 
is a generic term that can denote either the judge or the jury.30 The 
and accompanying text. The Palermo court reasoned simply that the remedy was not punitive, 
implying that its equitable character followed largely from that fact. 249 F.2d at 82. 
24. In Gnossos, the Fourth Circuit found the evidence of congressional intent regarding the 
jury trial issue in§ 504(c) cases to be inconclusive, but held that the seventh amendment provides 
a right to trial by jury. 653 F.2d at 119-21. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, relied on 
statutory construction in finding no right to jury trial, implicitly holding as well that the seventh 
amendment had no application to § 504(c) damages. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. 
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977). 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). 
26. See, e.g., Glazier v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Del. 1982); Rodgers v. 
Breckenridge Hotels Corp., 512 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1981). See also Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977); Cayman Music, Ltd. 
v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (interpreting similar language in the 1909 
copyright statute). Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (5th ed. 1979) ("The words 'court' and 
'judge' ... are frequently used in statutes as synonymous."). 
27. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), cited in Gnossis, 653 F.2d at 119. 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982) allows a private plaintiff alleging a violation of his civil rights 
under the Fair Housing Act to bring an action for damages as well as for injunctive relief. Curtis 
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1974). 
29. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). 
30. Gnossos, 653 F.2d at 119. This contention is buttressed by the use of the word "court" in 
the discussion of actual damage awards in the House Report on the Copyrights Act of 1976. 
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976). Since the award of actual damages has 
always been considered a legal remedy, Congress could not have meant to use the word "court" 
other than in its generic sense. 
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Gnossos court ignored, however, the statute's use of the word "discre-
tion" in addition to the phrase "as the court considers just."31 Discre-
tion is generally considered to be within the province of the judge, not 
the jury,32 and the use of the word "discretion" in a statute has been 
held to be important in characterizing the statute as one providing 
equitable relief.33 Thus, while the Gnossos court was probably correct 
in asserting that use of the word "court" is not indicative of Congres-
sional intent, 34 it ignored the plausible argument that other wording in 
the statutory damages provision supports the view that Congress in-
tended to provide for equitable relief. 35 
A second area of dispute is whether Congress intended to alter the 
effect of prior copyright legislation. One commentator, William Patry, 
has traced the history of the various federal copyright statutes from 
the original copyright act of 1790 to the current statute.36 Patry ar-
gues that since statutory copyright relief was demonstrably legal in 
nature in the nineteenth century,37 and since subsequent enactments 
have left statutory damage provisions substantially unchanged,38 one 
may infer that Congress intended such relief to be considered a legal 
31. "As the court considers just" appears in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l), and the word "discretion" 
is used with reference to the "court" in § 504(c)(2), the punitive damages provision. In addition, 
the legislative history of § 504(c)(l) indicates that Congress intended the "court" to "exercise 
discretion in awarding an amount within" the prescribed range of statutory damages. H.R. REP. 
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1976) (emphasis added). 
32. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 
1125,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("[J]uries are not normally thought of as exercising discre• 
tion. Their function is to find facts and to apply the law, as it is explained to them, to the 
facts."). See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 2.1, at 28 (1973) (noting 
that equity has been defined in terms of "discretion"); Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable 
Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524, 533 (1982) ("discretion ••• has always lain at the heart of 
equity jurisdiction"); Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Beller 
Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENvn. L. 477,480 (1979) ("In contrast to 
common law judges, chancellors acted with substantial discretion and rarely recorded the rea-
sons for their opinions."). 
33. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 
1125,059, at 15,310-11 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
34. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text. 
35. See notes 99-104 & 106-07 infra and accompanying text. 
36. See Patry, supra note 16, at 145-93. The history of the pre-1909 acts is also discussed in 
notes 62-74 infra and accompanying text. 
37. Patry based this premise on the case of Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899), discussed In 
Patry, supra note 16, at 169-72. The case involved an action for damages under an 1856 copy-
right statute that provided minimum damages for infringement of a copyright. Although the 
parties waived trial by jury, the report of the case specifically indicates that the action was at law. 
175 U.S. at 148. However, it is important to note that the damages sought in Brady are not 
completely analogous to modem statutory copyright damages. The plaintiff in Brady sought 
actual damages, which required factual proof of Joss. The statutory damages remedy, on the 
other hand, is discretionary and may be awarded absent any proof of loss. See text at notes 11-12 
supra. 
38. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 28 Stat. 956; Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 
320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-804 (1982). Patry is incor-
rect, however, in his assertion that all subsequent enactments have left statutory damages un-
changed. See notes 67-74 infra and accompanying text. 
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remedy under the latest copyright enactment.39 Even if Patry's view is 
correct that statutory damages in the nineteenth century were thought 
of as legal,40 by 1976 (the date of the most recent copyright enact-
ment) the courts were in disagreement over whether subsequent copy-
right enactments provided for equitable or legal relief.41 The three 
courts addressing the question in the two decades prior to 1976 held 
that statutory damages constituted equitable relief.42 Considering the 
judicial confusion as to the nature of statutory copyright damage pro-
visions from the nineteenth century to the present, it is not at all clear 
which view of the damage provisions Congress meant to adopt in its 
most recent enactment in 1976.43 The history offederal copyright leg-
islation is therefore inconclusive. 
Patry further argues that since the statute allows plaintiffs to elect 
between actual and statutory damages at any time until judgment is 
rendered, the right to a jury trial, which undeniably exists in actions 
seeking actual damages,44 must be afforded in suits for statutory dam-
ages as well. 45 Otherwise, he argues, the plaintiff would be forced to 
elect a remedy when he or she decides whether to demand a jury trial, 
a point in the proceedings well before trial. 46 This argument fails, 
however, because the statute only guarantees the plaintiff the right to a 
late election in switchingfrom actual damages to statutory damages.47 
39. Patry, supra note 16, at 190. 
40. In fact, statutory damages in their present form did not exist until 1909. See notes 67-74 
infra and accompanying text. Patry makes much of the fact that two nineteenth century copy-
right cases, Backus v. Gould, 48 U.S. 798 (1849), and Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899), were 
originally to have been tried before a jury. (In Brady the parties waived jury trial. 175 U.S. at 
151.) But both cases were decided under statutes providing for actual damages, and are therefore 
not relevant to the characterization of.statutory "in lieu" damages. 
41. Compare Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957) (no right to 
jury trial under the 1909 copyright act), with Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 
F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1977) (litigants have right to jury trial under 1909 statutory copyright 
provisions). · 
42. Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1957); Cayman Music, 
Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794, 797 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Serra v. Matias Photo Shop, 21 
F.R.D. 188, 190 (D.P.R. 1954). See also Maloney v. Stone, 171 F. Supp. 29, 31-32 (D. Mass. 
1959) (reaching the remarkable conclusion that all copyright damages - both statutory and 
actual - are equitable in nature). 
43. In interpreting a statutory amendment, it is generally presumed that the legislature that 
enacted the amendment was aware of how courts had construed the original act. SUTHERLAND 
STAT. CONST. § 22.35 (4th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1985). 
44. See note 79 infra and accompanying text. 
45. Patry, supra note 16, at 191. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). The relevant statutory 
language is quoted in note 47 infra. 
46. Patry, supra note 16, at 191. 
47. The relevant portion of the statute reads: "[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time 
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of 
statutory damages •••. " 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). The legislative history also suggests that 
the right to a late election of remedies works in only one direction: "Subsection (c) of section 504 
makes clear that the plaintiffs election to recover statutory damages may take place at any time 
during the trial before the court has rendered its final judgment." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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This late election is not impeded by the disparity in jury trial rights 
between statutory and actual relief. If the plaintiff has brought an ac-
tion for actual damages, he may at the last minute change his mind 
and ask the judge for statutory relief. The judge would then be justi-
fied in taking the case away from the jury.48 It is only the reverse 
decision (from statutory damages to actual damages) that is prema-
turely forced by the necessity of demanding a jury trial.49 The copy-
right act does not guarantee the plaintiff the right to make this reverse 
election as late as immediately before judgment. so 
Patry's final statutory construction argument centers on the fact 
that section 504(c) establishes a separate set of damages, with a higher 
maximum, for willful copyright infringements.st Patry attacks the 
characterization of ordinary statutory damages as equitable, based on 
an assumption that such a characterization, once made, would neces-
sarily apply to the willful infringement damages provision of section 
504(c). Since the latter damages are clearly punitive, and since puni-
tive damages have sometimes been regarded as legal, sz Patry takes is-
sue with the characterization of the entire section as equitable.s3 
Aside from the possibility that the penal provisions may be applied 
separately from the other statutory damages, s4 this argument is unper-
suasive since other remedies, clearly penal in nature, have been held 
properly tried before a judge. ss Thus, statutory construction again 
48. Such a procedure is not "wasteful." Allowing a plaintiff to exercise a late choice between 
judge and jury will present situations where a jury, having been impaneled and after viewing the 
entire trial, is dismissed without ever being called upon to decide the case. But such a system 
would consume no more judicial resources than a full right to jury trial, which Congress surely 
could provide. Viewed from the point at which the plaintiff makes his or her decision, it does not 
matter whether the judge or jury ultimately decides the case. The outlay of resources is a fixed 
cost, and will be the same regardless of the plaintiff's choice. 
49. If the plaintiff were allowed to change his mind at the last minute after presenting his 
claim for statutory relief to the judge, the defendant would be denied the opportunity to make a 
timely motion for jury trial. 
50. Nothing in the statute implies that a plaintiff may elect actual damages "at any time 
before final judgment is rendered." See note 47 supra. 
51. If the "court" finds that the infringement was willful the maximum allowable damage 
award increases to $50,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1982). 
52. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) ("[T]he relief sought here - actual and 
punitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law."). However, 
some courts have held that punitive damages may be properly awarded in equity. See cases cited 
in note 55 infra. 
53. Patry, supra note 16, at 191 ("It is simply incredible that a defendant may be held liable 
for $50,000 in damages, by a fact finding of willfulness, and have this considered an equitable 
proceeding."). . 
54. Even if Patry were correct that plaintiffs seeking damages greater than $10,000 must 
submit to a trial by jury if the defendant requests one, ordinary statutory damage claims under 
§ 504(c)(l) could still be treated as equitable. 
55. Charles v. Epperson & Co., 258 Iowa 409, 137 N.W.2d 605 (1965); Tideway Oil Pro-
grams, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1983), discussed in Recent Decisions, Courts Are 
Empowered to Award Punitive Damages, 53 Miss. L.J. 521 (1983); International Bankers Life 
Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963). 
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fails to supply a definitive answer to the question whether federal 
copyright damages are properly considered legal or equitable, and 
therefore to whether a seventh amendment right to trial by jury exists 
in statutory damages cases. 
B. Constitutional Analysis: The Historical Test 
Regardless of whether Congress intended a remedy to be legal, the 
seventh amendment requires that a jury trial be made available to the 
parties if that remedy bears the indicia of legal relief. 56 In Ross v. 
Bernhard, 51 the Supreme Court enunciated the following three-part 
test for determining whether an issue should be characterized as 
"legal" or "equitable":58 "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is determined 
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such 
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities 
and limitations of juries."59 The first two elements of this test are per-
mutations of the traditional "historical test"60 for characterizing cases 
under the seventh amendment. The third element - the abilities of 
juries - represents a possible departure from traditional analysis.61 
56. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). 
57. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
58. Ross is only one of a series of Supreme Court cases interpreting the seventh amendment. 
Two of the more famous of these, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), and Beacon 
Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), are distinguishable for present purposes because they 
dealt not with characterizing a particular issue as legal or equitable, but with characterizing a 
case that combines both equitable and legal issues. These cases are discussed in more detail in 
Part II infra. See notes 140-47 infra and accompanying text. 
59. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court held that a 
new statutory cause of action falls within the scope of the seventh amendment "if the statute 
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of 
Jaw." 415 U.S. at 194. The Curtis court used "nature of the remedy" reasoning to conclude that 
title VIII cases are legal. The court did not mention or apply the other two parts of the Ross test, 
perhaps because the second part - nature of the remedy - was so clearly dispositive of the case. 
In finding that section 504(c) damages were legal in nature, the Fourth Circuit in Gnossos 
Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981), applied its own unique formulation of the 
Curtis holding. This formulation, which had its genesis in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 
216 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978), operated by dividing a cause of action into two 
components - the rights protected and the remedy granted - each to be examined separately 
and characterized as either legal or equitable. (In Gnossos the court concluded that both the 
rights and the remedy were legal.) 
Aside from the fact that such a test is inconsistent with the Ross test, the split into "rights" 
and "remedies" adopted by the Fourth Circuit is as conclusory and unhelpful as attempts to 
characterize the case as a whole. (For examples of the latter difficulty see notes 75-80 infra and 
accompanying text.) Labelling an element of a cause of action a "right" or a "remedy" does little 
to advance the seventh amendment inquiry; what is needed is a method for determining if a right 
or a remedy is "legal." The Ross test, at least, provides a substantive answer to this question. 
60. See Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh 
Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 43, 44 (1980) ("The first two taken together are in effect the 
historical test; the third factor is sometimes referred to as the pragmatic test."). 
61. See Devlin, supra note 60, at 44. 
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1. Pre-merger Custom 
The first inquiry in the three-prong Ross test is a historical one: 
whether prior to the merger of law and equity, the cause of action was 
considered to be legal or equitable. Unfortunately, this historical anal-
ysis fails to yield a definitive answer to the question of whether statu-
tory copyright damages are properly characterized as legal or 
equitable. 62 Originally, the copyright remedy was one at common 
law. 63 This traditional remedy was supplemented in England in the 
seventeenth century by statutory copyright remedies, 64 and in 
America in the eighteenth century by state statutes.65 These remedies, 
too, were apparently legal in nature. 66 The first federal copyright leg-
islation was enacted in 1790, 67 and was amended periodically through-
out the nineteenth century.68 The original federal statute explicitly 
provided for relief to be granted in actions at law;69 a subsequent act 
extended jurisdiction to federal equity courts over suits in which an 
injunction was sought. 70 
None of the Anglo-American statutory copyright enactments prior 
62. The federal courts have differed over whether copyright actions were historically legal or 
equitable. Compare Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
statutory copyright damages were historically legal), with Cayman Music, Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 
403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (holding that statutory copyright damages were historically 
equitable.). 
63. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-57 (1834); Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows 
2303, 2312, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 206 (K.B. 1769). One historian has concluded that common law 
copyright protection existed in England at least as early as 1662. B. BUGBEE, THE EARLY 
AMERICAN LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND CoPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 133 (1960) (unpublished dissertation). 
64. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19. This statute provided a specified amount of dam-
ages for every infringing copy. 
65. CoPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BULLETIN No. 3 (REVISED), CoPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 
1-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS], cited in Patry, supra note 16, at 
148-51. These statutes generally provided for a fixed amount of damages per copy. COPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS, supra, at 1-21. 
66. See Patry, supra note 16, at 151. Seven of the twelve states with copyright enactments 
specifically assigned them to a law court. Patry bases his inference that the remainder of the 
state statutes were also legal on (I) the statutes' failure to grant equity jurisdiction, (2) a general 
lack of equity courts in colonial America, and (3) a widespread contemporary hostility toward 
chancery courts. 
67. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. See Patry, supra note 16, at 155. The power to 
grant copyright protection had been ceded by the states to the federal government by the Consti-
tution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 589 
(1834), held that the federal copyright remedy was a new form of relief which supplanted the 
common law cause of action. 
68. The most significant amendments were Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 14, 4 Stat. 436; Act of 
Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; and Act of Mar. 3, 
1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. None of the 19th century amendments contained a provision for "in 
lieu" damages such as later appeared in the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. See 
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 65, at 24-59. 
69. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
70. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481. 
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to 1909, however, provided plaintiffs with the option of an alternative 
form of relief in lieu of actual damages.71 While prior federal (and 
colonial) statutes had placed minimums and maximums on the 
amount to be recovered in a copyright case, these limits applied to 
actual, provable damages, not to a wholly discretionary amount set by 
the court.72 It was not until 1909 that statutory damages were added 
to the federal copyright statute. 73 Therefore, the pre-1909 history of 
copyright damages is of little relevance to the question of whether stat-
utory damages are best characterized as legal or equitable. 74 
When a modern cause of action has no 1791 (pre-seventh-amend-
ment) counterpart, courts often rely upon the closest 1791 analogy to 
11. See note 68 supra. 
72. Statutory limits in the nineteenth century were applied to actual damages, under the Act 
of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. In contrast, § 504(c) damages are not tied to factual loss. 
Indeed, statutory copyright damages may be recovered absent any showing of loss due to the 
infringement. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
73. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, repealed by Copyrights Act 
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-804 (1982). 
74. The characteristic that distinguishes the "in lieu" statutory relief introduced in 1909 
from prior copyright relief is the former's complete reliance on the discretion of the court. It is 
this very feature of statutory relief that leads many observers to characterize it as an equitable 
remedy. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text. 
Though Patry argues otherwise, see Patry, supra note 16, at 173-77, his attempt to show a 
string of essentially unchanged legal copyright statutes is disrupted by the 1909 act. Patry em-
phasizes the 1909 act's retention of several important features of the nineteenth century copy-
right acts, such as the provision for minimum and maximum damages and the words "as to the 
court shall appear to be just." He thereby concludes that the 1909 act did not constitute a 
substantial departure from earlier copyright enactments. However, Patry ignores the fact that 
the 1909 act was the first copyright legislation to award statutory damages "in lieu of actual 
damages," thereby removing from the amount recovered any necessary connection with factual 
loss. 
In support of his argument that the 1909 act did not constitute a substantial departure from 
earlier copyright enactments, Patry further contends that the 1909 act merely reenacted the lan-
guage of a prior statute governing damages for infringement of dramatic or musical composi-
tions. Id. at 176. This prior statute read in pertinent part: 
Any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical composition for 
which a copyright has been obtained, . . . shall be liable for damages therefor, such dam-
ages . . . to be assessed at such sum • . . as to the court shall appear to be just. 
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 101, 16 Stat. 198, 214 (1871) (repealed 1909). 
The 1909 act, on the other hand, provided in pertinent part: 
[I]f any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws 
. • . such person shall be liable: 
. . • to pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may 
have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have 
made from such infringement. . • or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as 
to the court shall appear to be just • . . . 
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, repealed by Copyrights Act of 1976, 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-804 (1982) (emphasis added). 
Although Patry argues that the above statutes are essentially the same, careful inspection of 
the two acts demonstrates that only one damage provision is created by the pre-1909 law, 
whereas three separate provisions are established by the 1909 act: actual damages, profits, and 
"in lieu" damages. The "in lieu" clause has no counterpart in the pre-1909 act. Furthermore, 
Patry makes the unsupported statement that the phrase "as to the court shall appear to be just" 
in the 1909 act was intended to modify the entire section, including the provisions relating to 
actual damages and profits. Patry, supra note 16, at 176. Again, careful inspection of the act 
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determine if the modern action is equitable or legal.75 The Gnossos 
court, for example, analogized statutory copyright damages to two 
traditional common law actions: tortious interference with property 
rights and the common law action for debt. 76 
The court's analogy to tort law is unhelpful. Copyright actions 
protect property interests, and therefore sound in tort, but this fact 
does not aid in determining whether statutory copyright actions are 
"legal." Tort actions - particularly property-interference tort actions 
- can be either legal or equitable, depending on the relief sought. 77 
Indeed, the copyright statute is a good example of this phenomenon. 
If the relief sought in a copyright case is an injunction, the cause of 
action is equitable; 78 if actual damages or profits are sought, it is 
legal. 79 The important question is how to categorize the remedy of 
statutory relief; categorization of the right protected is not useful. 80 
The analogy to an action for debt is more helpful - at least it 
characterizes the relief sought. The Supreme Court, however, has de-
scribed the action for debt as lying "whenever a sum certain is due to 
the plaintiff, or a sum which can readily be reduced to a cer-
tainty .... " 81 But statutory damages are completely unlike a "sum 
certain" - they are determined entirely at the discretion of the court, 
within prescribed limits.82 Thus, the action for debt is distinguishable 
from an action for statutory damages for precisely the reason that 
most strongly characterizes the latter as an equitable action - its 
highly discretionary nature. 83 
Since statutory damages did not exist prior to the twentieth cen-
tury, and since no traditional form of relief is directly analogous to 
such damages, 84 the pre-merger history of copyright damages is incon-
clusive as to whether statutory damages should be regarded as legal or 
defeats Patry's contentions. The phrase "as to the court shall appear to be just" is intended to 
modify only "such damages" as may be awarded in lieu of actual damages and profits. 
Patry's statutory construction arguments are thus unpersuasive. The 1909 act's "in lieu" 
damages did not represent a reenactment of traditional legal copyright relief, but rather a wholly 
novel discretionary remedy. 
1S. See, e.g., In re Vorpahl, 69S F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982) (analogizing ERISA actions to 
ancient actions for abuse of trust); Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(analogizing copyright damages to the ancient action for debt). See also Redish, supra note 7, at 
491. 
76. See Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981). 
11. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, SS0 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting), 
78. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 64S F.2d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1981). 
19. See Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 1983). 
80. An action for nuisance, for example, can be brought in equity if the plaintiff seeks an 
injunction, and at law if the plaintiff seeks damages. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 89 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.5, at 59. 
81. Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 542 (1871) (emphasis added). 
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982); text at note 25 supra. 
83. See note 32 supra. 
84. See notes 63-74 supra and accompanying text. 
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equitable. Guidance must therefore be sought in the second and third 
prongs of the test enunciated in Ross v. Bernhard. 85 
2. Nature of the Remedy 
The second prong of the Ross test inquires whether the remedy 
sought is fundamentally equitable or legal in nature. 86 This inquiry 
presupposes, of course, that specific factors can be identified as "fun-
damentally" characteristic of equitable or legal remedies. Although 
the validity of this assumption is disputed, 87 courts have adopted gen-
eralizations that purport to identify the primary characteristics of eq-
uitable and legal relief. 88 In the context of statutory damages, the two 
most important characterizations are the general associations of mone-
tary relief with legal jurisdiction, 89 and of "discretionary" relief with 
equitable jurisdiction.90 An analysis of these factors leads to the con-
clusion that statutory copyright damages are best characterized as 
equitable. 
The strongest factor weighing in favor of characterizing statutory 
copyright damages as "legal" is that they provide for monetary relief. 
Money damages have generally been associated with legal jurisdic-
tion, 91 unlike specific performance, which has typically been associ-
85. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). See text at notes 57-61 supra. 
86. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
87. See, e.g .• 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 639 (London 1869) ("It is impos-
sible to give any idea of [English equity], in general or abstract expressions .... In order to 
explain to a foreigner the nature of English equity, it would be necessary to enumerate all the 
cases in which the Chancellor had interposed to supply or correct the defects of the law adminis-
tered by the Common Law Courts. The notion that there is any essential or necessary distinction 
is the merest absurdity."). 
88. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text .. 
89. See note 91 infra and accompanying text. 
90. See note 32 supra. The objection might be raised that associating "discretion" with eq-
uity jurisdiction is as formalistic a distinction as that between equity and law, a distinction criti-
cized elsewhere in this Note. See notes 123-35 infra and accompanying text. That is, juries 
necessarily exercise great discretion in inferring "facts" from evidence and in other areas, and 
judges in practice apply their own versions of facts in making necessary determinations from the 
bench. 
Nevertheless, jurors were historically thought of as deciding rigidly defined issues of fact, 
which would then be "plugged into" legal formulae explained by the judge. See Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1] 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 
1979). Since the prevailing interpretation of the seventh amendment demands an inquiry into 
how a modern cause of action would have been characterized historically, see notes 50-54 supra 
and accompanying text, the modern jurist must apply distinctions recognized historically, 
whether those distinctions now seem formal or not. As defined by the historical approach, analy-
sis under the seventh amendment must be limited to modes of thought accepted at the time of the 
amendment's adoption. That those modes of thought may not have been rational is irrelevant to 
this analysis. 
For purposes of this Part of the Note - that is, for purposes of characterizing statutory 
copyright relief as legal or equitable - the historical test is accepted as the appropriate standard 
in spite of its inadequacies. For a proposal to minimize the pernicious effects of the historical 
test, see Part II infra. 
91. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 
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ated with equitable jurisdiction.92 The force of this argument is 
limited, however, by two historical characteristics of equity and legal 
courts. First, equity courts were traditionally authorized to grant 
monetary relief, provided such relief was "restitutionary."93 Second, 
traditional legal relief, though monetary, was never associated with the 
degree of discretion conferred by section 504(c).94 
Two courts have held that statutory copyright damages, which 
seek to restore (albeit roughly)95 the copyright owner to the position 
he or she occupied prior to the infringement, can be regarded as "resti-
tutionary. "96 Indeed, statutory damages have been likened to the 
backpay remedy of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964,97 which 
lower courts have consistently held to be restitutionary and therefore 
1125,059, at 15,310 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("Monetary relief is generally provided by courts of law."). 
See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) ("The relief sought here - actual and 
punitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law."); E. STASON, 
supra note 1, at 88 (noting that a decree at law was an award of money, or, in some cases, 
possession of property). 
92. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 126-27 (1948). Indeed, a requirement for 
granting equitable relief is that legal (monetary) relief be inadequate. D. DOBBS, supra note 32, 
§ 2.5, at 57. 
93. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974); D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1, at 222-23 
(observing that restitution may be appropriate in either a legal or equitable proceeding); David• 
son, The Equitable Remedy of Compensation, 13 MELD. U. L. REv. 349 (1982) (arguing that 
restitution - or "compensation," as the author terms such relief - has always been available at 
equity). See also notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text. 
94. See notes 99-107 infra and accompanying text. 
95. See note 97 infra. 
96. See Glazier v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1982); Broadcast Musk, Inc. 
v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 CoPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1125,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
"Restitution" has historically been defined as that measure of damages that will restore the plain-
tiff to the position he or she would have occupied had it not been for the defendant's actions. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979). See D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1 at 222. 
Alternatively, "restitution" has been used to describe the measure of damages owed by a defend-
ant who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY at 
1180; RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrurloN §§ 1-2 (1937). Both definitions - particularly the latter 
- aptly describe the purpose and effect of copyright damages. 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). This comparison is made, for example, in Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc., v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 CoPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. 
Ind. 1979). 
Patry rejects the analogy between statutory damages and the backpay provisions of title VII. 
Patty, supra note 16, at 189. He distinguishes the two forms of relief on the grounds that (1) un-
like copyright claims, claims of racial discrimination under title VII can often evoke racial preju-
dice among jurors; and (2) unlike backpay, "statutory copyright damages are not in the nature of 
restitution" because they are imprecise. Id. 
Patry's first point of differentiation is well taken. It is likely that courts holding title VII 
cases to be equitable have been influenced by the risk of racial prejudice among potential jurors. 
Patry fails to show, however, why statutory copyright damages and backpay are not both "resti-
tutionary." The mere fact that § 504(c) damages are not a precise measure of a plaintifrs loss 
does not mean that they are not restitutionary. The very purpose of such relief is to provide 
restoration of a plaintiffs loss when the actual loss is difficult to prove. See note 96 supra. 
Backpay damages may be more precise than § 504(c) damages, but precision is not a necessary 
element of "restitution." 
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equitable. 98 
More important, traditional legal damages were either tied to a 
specific factual loss (the "facts" to be determined by the jury) or were 
punitive in nature.99 Statutory copyright damages are not punitive un-
less brought under the provisions of section 504( d). 100 Moreover, they 
are not tied to any factual loss, but rather depend solely on the court's 
determination of a ''just" level of damages within the statutory 
limits.101 
This degree of discretion is an element foreign to actions at law, 102 
and is one of the features seized on by both courts and commentators 
as especially characteristic of equity jurisdiction.103 Several courts, la-
belling particular forms of statutory relief as equitable, have based 
their decisions in large part on the appearance of the word "discre-
tion" in the statute.104 To be sure, some commentators have argued 
against associating discretion solely with equity jurisdiction, asserting 
that law judges were also historically invested with a certain amount 
of discretion.105 As a general proposition, however, "discretion" is 
certainly more closely associated with equity than with law. 106 Fur-
ther, it appears settled that discretion is an appropriate factor to be 
taken into account in characterizing a cause of action for purposes of 
the seventh amendment.107 
98. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974), and cases cited therein; see also Slack 
v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975). 
99. See note 91 supra; D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 3.2, at 138-39 (pointing out that legal 
damages are generally measured by reference to some value). That legal damages are intended to 
be tied to factual loss is evidenced by the legal rule that damages not proved with reasonable 
certainty are not recoverable. See Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 643-44, 242 
N.W.2d 372, 373-74 (1976). 
100. Statutory damages have been held not punitive in nature. L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dis-
patch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1919). In any event, even damages that are concededly 
punitive may be regarded as equitable. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. 
101. It may be argued that the court must still find the "fact" of infringement. However, this 
kind of "fact" (liability) must be found in all equitable (and legal) cases. What distinguishes legal 
, cases is the "factual" nature of the remedy, as contrasted with the "discretionary" nature of 
equitable remedies. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 549-50 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting), 
for a similar argument. 
102. J. POMEROY, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 109 (4th ed. 1918) ("The distin-
guishing characteristics oflegal remedies are their uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixed-
ness, their lack of adaptation to circumstances, and the technical rules which govern their use."). 
103. See note 32 supra. 
104. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1957); Glazier 
v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Del. 1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, 
Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1J 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
105. See Redish, supra note 7, at 529; Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment and Fair Labor Standards Acts, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 365, 374 n.57 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO Comment]; Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil 
Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 523-24 (1973). 
106. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974); see also note 32 supra. For a response 
to the argument that the association of discretion with equity is formalistic, see note 90 supra. 
107. The Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974), implied that the 
discretion permitted in granting relief is relevant in characterizing the relief as equitable. 
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The 1974 Supreme Court holding in Curtis v. Loether 108 lends sup-
port to the foregoing analysis. Curtis involved a plaintiff's suit for 
·damages and injunctive relief pursuant to Title VIII (the Fair Housing 
provision) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.109 The Court held that the 
damages sought, described by the plaintiff as actual and punitive, were 
"legal" in nature and hence within the purview of the seventh amend-
ment.110 However, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, care-
fully distinguished the plaintiff's cause of action from title VII suits for 
job reinstatement and backpay, which lower courts had consistently 
held to be equitable.1 11 Not all monetary statutory relief was "legal," 
he noted. Title VII backpay was restitutionary in nature, and the au-
thorizing statutory language ("as the court deems appropriate") in-
vested the factfinder with greater discretion than did title VIII 
provisions. 112 
Section 5O4(c) copyright relief, like title VII relief, has been char-
acterized as "restitutionary" in nature.113 In addition, the copyright 
statute invests the fact-finder with great discretion in determining sec-
tion 5O4(c) damages.114 Applying the reasoning of Curtis v. Loether, 
statutory copyright damages are analogous to title VII backpay dam-
ages.115 Characterization of statutory damages as "equitable" is there-
fore entirely consistent with Curtis, and is the correct result under the 
second prong of the Ross test. 
3. Abilities of Juries 
The third prong of the Ross test concerns the "abilities and limita-
tions of juries."116 Under this leg of the test, a cause of action is more 
likely to be considered equitable if it typically raises issues too complex 
for the average juror to comprehend and decide fairly.1 17 
This final leg of the Ross test does not aid in determining whether 
statutory copyright damages are properly considered legal or equita-
ble. Admittedly, the issues involved in determining whether an in-
fringement has occurred and what damages are appropriate are not 
108. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
109. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982). 
110. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96. 
111. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97. 
112. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197. 
113. See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. 
115. See note 97 supra. 
116. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,538 n.10 (1970). See also notes 58-61 supra and accom-
panying text. 
117. See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 529-30 (D. Conn. 1977) 
(holding case to be "legal" since, inter alia, issues were not overly complicated for jury). See also 
Redish, supra note 7, at 523-25, concerning the impact of the third prong. 
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generally of a prohibitively complex nature, 118 suggesting that copy-
right damages should always be regarded as legal. However, the third 
prong of the Ross test, as it has been applied, works in only one direc-
tion. That is, if a case is too complex for a jury, it is considered equita-
ble; but if it is within the grasp of a jury, it is considered also to be 
within the grasp of a judge, and the test is inconclusive.119 
On the other hand, even if statutory copyright issues were very 
complicated, the same issues would be raised in suits for actual dam-
ages, which have always been considered legal.120 Therefore, the com-
plexity factor cannot operate to make statutory damages equitable, 
without operating to make all copyright damages equitable. The third 
prong of the Ross test has not received a sufficiently positive response 
by lower courts to justify a change in the accepted characterization of 
actual damages.121 This prong of the Ross test is thus not helpful in 
determining whether issues within the competence of both judge and 
jury should be characterized as legal or equitable, and is therefore not 
determinative in the context of statutory copyright damages. 
In sum, neither the first nor the third element of the Ross inquiry 
answers the question of whether statutory damages are legal or equita-
ble.122 Therefore, the second element of the test - the nature of the 
remedy - is determinative. Statutory damages are highly discretion-
ary and do not bear any necessary relationship to factual loss. These 
characteristics are more consistent with equitable than with legal juris-
diction and suggest that statutory damages are best characterized as 
equitable. Accordingly, no right to a jury trial should exist in cases 
brought to recover statutory copyright damages. 
118. See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1977). 
119. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 
1125,059, at 15,310 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 
530 (D. Conn. 1977). This analysis is to be distinguished from a second test, used when the 
remedy is clearly legal. In such a case, if the issues are not overly complex, the jury will try the 
case (since the remedy is a legal one). The present discussion seeks to identify the statutory cause 
of actlon as legal or equitable, a different inquiry. 
120. The question ofliability is the same in suits for actual and statutory damages. The issue 
of calculating damages, however, is more complicated in actual damages cases than in statutory 
damages cases. Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528,530 (D. Conn. 1977). 
Thus, if a statutory damages case is too complex to be presented to a jury, the same is true of an 
actual damages case brought on identical facts. 
121. For example, only one of the cases considering the seventh amendment's application to 
§ 504(c) relief has even acknowledged the third prong of the Ross test. In Broadcast Music, Inc. 
v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,059, at 15,310 (N.D. Ind. 1979), 
the court concluded that the issue was within the competence of both judge and jury, so that the 
test was inconclusive. 
122. The same conclusion was reached in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-
81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,059 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LIMITING THE SEVENTH 
AMENDMENT'S SCOPE 
The problem of characterizing section 504(c) damages is merely 
one example of the difficulties faced by federal courts under the pre-
vailing interpretation of the seventh amendment. 123 Related problems 
of allocating jury trials and classifying causes of action have led many 
observers to decry the antiquated practice of granting the right to jury 
trial only in cases that would have been characterized as "legal" in 
1791.124 Due to the clear language of the seventh amendment, the 
historical approach is largely unavoidable. 125 Courts retain greater 
latitude, however, in classifying new causes of action such as section 
504( c) damages. When confronted with causes of action that did not 
exist in 1791, courts may define "law" narrowly, and "equity" 
broadly, without doing violence to either the Constitution or settled 
Supreme Court doctrine. 126 Such an approach would minimize the 
number of cases in which the seventh amendment mandates an abso-
lute right to a jury trial, and maximize the number of cases in which 
rational, utilitarian decisions could be made about whether to provide 
a jury trial. 
That the seventh amendment produces interpretative problems and 
leads to an irrational allocation of the right to jury trials has been 
widely recognized.127 Were it not for the seventh amendment, the an-
tiquated distinction between law and equity would have greatly de-
clined in significance.128 Today, the most important reason for the 
continued existence of an equity /law distinction is the allocation of 
jury trials. Unfortunately, cases are assigned the "legal" or "equita-
ble" label for reasons wholly unrelated to the jury question. 
As the situation now stands, a party's right to a jury trial in a civil 
case depends upon whether the cause of action would have been char-
acterized as "legal" or "equitable" in 1791. Perhaps the most dis-
123. Other examples include seventh amendment law/equity questions arising out of ERISA 
actions, In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982); employment discrimination cases, Johnson 
v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); and fair housing cases, Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
124. See Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment, 81 MICH, L. REV, 1571, 
1575 (1983); James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 664 (1963); Redish, 
supra note 7, at 486-87. 
125. See James, supra note 124, at 664 (conceding that the historical test is a necessary result 
of the seventh amendment's language, but arguing that courts should exercise greater flexibility 
in applying that test). 
126. Such an approach would not be inconsistent with recent Supreme Court rulings. See 
notes 140-47 infra and accompanying text. 
127. See note 124 supra and accompanying text. 
128. See E. STAS0N, supra note 1, at 90. The distinction remains in two other areas of the 
law. First, the right to "equitable" relief (an injunction) is still based on the inadequacy of 
"legal" relief (money damages). Second, the scope of appellate review is still affected by whether 
the issue is legal or equitable. Id. 
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turbing aspect of this method of allocating jury trials is that, 
historically, the suitability of a case for jury trial was not an important 
factor in determining whether an emerging cause of action fell within 
equitable or legal jurisdiction.129 As Professor James has noted, 
whether a case came to be equitable rather than legal frequently had 
more to do with the evidentiary, procedural, or relief-granting capabil-
ities of equity than with the appropriateness of the case for judicial 
determination.130 In some instances, equity's jurisdiction over a case 
depended simply on the Chancellor's political influence at a particular 
time.131 
Even if it were rational to allocate civil jury trials according to 
whether a case was historically "legal" or "equitable," deciding into 
which category a case fits is difficult. 132 Authorities have remarked on 
more than one occasion that "equity" is impossible to define descrip-
tively .133 An attempt to categorize a case according to whether its 
closest 1791 analogue was considered equitable or legal may prove 
equally fruitless, since no guidelines for choosing the "closest" ana-
logue are satisfactory. As the discussion of section 5O4(c) damages 
suggests, the "closest" analogue may be equitable or legal, depending 
on whether it is chosen according to the type of right being protected, 
the type of relief being provided, or any number of other factors. 134 
The seventh amendment as it is now interpreted thus perpetuates an 
irrational and unworkable system for allocating jury trials.135 
129. James, supra note 124, at 661 ("At no time in history was the line dividing equity from 
law altogether - or even largely - the product of a rational choice between issues which were 
better suited to court or to jury trial."). 
130. James, supra note 124, at 661-63. One English writer has expressed dismay at how the 
historic dichotomy is used in America: "There seemed to me to be something surprisingly obso-
lete about deciding upon the mode of trial, not as the Supreme Court had hinted in 1970 by 
reference to 'the practical abilities and limitations of juries' but by reference to a line reached in 
another country ... nearly two centuries before." Devlin, supra note 124, at 1575. Lord Devlin 
has urged that some of the more unfortunate consequences of the seventh amendment can be 
avoided by applying the doctrine, known to English equity in 1791, that even clearly legal cases 
are to be tried in equity if the case is too complex for a jury to comprehend. Id. at 1599-605. 
131. w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-63 (1922), quoted in E. STASON, 
supra note 1, at 77-81 (relating the highlights of the long-running struggle between the Chancel-
lor and the King's Bench). 
132. James, supra note 124, at 668 ("[H]istory is sometimes equivocal."). See also note 87 
supra. 
133. The words of Professor Maitland are particularly apt: 
[W]e are driven to say that Equity now is that body of rules administered by our English 
courts of justice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be ad-
ministered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of Equity. 
This, you may well say, is but a poor thing to call a definition. • . . Still I fear that 
nothing better than this is possible. 
F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (1936), quoted in E. STASON, supra note 1, at 72. See also note 87 
supra. 
134. See text at notes 75-80 supra. 
135. The problems caused by the seventh amendment's historical approach to jury allocation 
have led to numerous proposals for reform more extreme than that proposed in this Note. See, 
e.g., James, supra note 124, at 690 (proposal to take post-1791 trends into account); Redish, 
1968 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1950 
The constitutional mandate that "the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved"136 requires a principled allocation of that right to new 
causes of action, not a rigid historical inquiry. To that end, this Note 
proposes a straightforward solution that should prove effective: courts 
should interpret "equity" more broadly when defining newly created 
statutory causes of action. When a new statutory cause of action is 
neither clearly legal nor clearly equitable, and no pre-1791 analogy 
seems determinative, that cause of action should be regarded as equita-
ble. Such a policy would limit the cases in which the seventh amend-
ment requires a jury trial, thus leaving more cases free for legislative 
determination of the appropriateness of jury trial. 137 
This approach does not do violence to the constitutional guarantee 
of the right to a jury trial in civil cases.138 A broadened definition of 
equity would affect only those few causes of action that have been 
newly created by Congress, and that seem ~o fit neither the "legal" nor 
the "equitable" definition. The historical argument that the framers 
"intended" to guarantee the right to a jury trial is weakest in a case of 
this type. A broad judicial definition of equity would simply allow 
supra note 7, at 517 (proposal to interpret seventh amendment strictly); CHICAGO Comment, 
supra note 105, at 365 (proposal to take the abilities of juries into account to a greater extent), 
Perhaps the most striking suggestion was Professor Redish's proposal to interpret the seventh 
amendment quite narrowly: "One possible means of employing the historical approach to 
achieve much the same flexibility would be to reject all forms of the rational approach .•.• [A] 
rigid historical approach would • . . dictate that, unless the actual substantive cause of action 
existed in 1791, the seventh amendment does not guarantee a right to jury trial."). 
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
137. The seventh amendment only "preserves" the right to jury trial in legal cases. Since the 
amendment makes no provision for cases not considered legal, Congress is free to decide whether 
or not to provide jury trials in such cases. Thus, defining "equity" broadly increases the number 
of actions for which Congress may decide the appropriateness of providing a jury trial, and 
decreases the number of actions in which a right to jury trial is rigidly required by the Constitu-
tion. 
· The legislature could make the jury trial requirement in a given type of case depend upon, for 
example, the nature and complexity of the issues to be decided, whether a need exists for uniform 
case-by-case results, and whether the remedy is to be applied so as to fit consistently within a 
broader legislative scheme. Professor Redish has made a similar, albeit more extreme proposal. 
See note 135 supra. 
138. Robert Patry, in his discussion of copyright damages, has expressed concern over sug-
gestions that the scope of the seventh amendment be narrowed: 
The right to a jury is one of our most cherished rights. It cannot be denied on the grounds 
of expediency, or on the ground that judges are allegedly more flexible or just than juries. 
The reasons our forefathers fought for the right to a jury are as valid today as they ever 
were. 
Patry, supra note 16, at 194. 
It appears, however, that the institution of civil jury trial is not considered quite the prized 
tradition it once was. Attacks on the efficacy and fairness of the civil jury have been heard from 
several quarters in the last half-century. The most famous of these attacks was unleashed by 
Judge Frank, who complained that "a better instrument than the usual jury trial could scarcely 
be imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of the [rules], 
and unpredictability of decisions." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949). Jury trials also 
have been blamed for much of the delay plaguing the modem federal court system. Hazard, 
Book Review, 48 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 360 (1960), cited in Redish, supra note 7, at 506 n.84; Peck, Do 
Juries Delay Justice?, 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956). 
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Congress to allocate jury trials on a more rational basis than does the 
present equitable/legal distinction.139 
The proposed approach is also not inconsistent with established 
Supreme Court policy. At first glance, a restrictive interpretation of 
the seventh amendment would appear to run counter to the Supreme 
Court's opinions in Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 140 Dairy Queen, Inc. 
v. Wood, 141 and Ross v. Bernhard, 142 which support expansion of the 
right to trial by jury.143 However, these three cases dealt not with the 
characterization of a new cause of action as equitable or legal, but with 
the jury trial consequences when recognizable equitable and legal is-
sues were presented in the same case.144 The very most that can be 
said for the applicability of these cases to the characterization of new 
causes of action is that they reflect a general bias on the Court's part in 
favor of expanding the seventh amendment's scope. Such an interpre-
139. See notes 127-37 supra and accompanying text. 
140. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
141. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
142. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
143. See generally Patry, supra note 16, at 181-85 (relating Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen 
to the statutory copyright damages dispute). 
144. In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendant's filing of 
an antitrust claim. The defendant responded by counterclaiming with an antitrust count. 359 
U.S. at 502-03. The Court held that the legal claim (the antitrust count) had to be tried to the 
jury before the equitable claim (the injunction) could be decided by the judge. Otherwise, rea-
soned the Court, the judge's ruling on the injunction might bar the defendant's antitrust claim by 
resjudicata, thereby depriving defendant of his right to a jury trial on that claim. 359 U.S. at 507-
08. Beacon Theatres is directly applicable, therefore, only to the issue of deciding the order of 
trial when recognizable equitable and legal claims are found in the same action. It does not speak 
to the issue of defining a new cause of action as "equitable" or "legal." 
The same may be said for Dairy Queen, decided three years later. The plaintiff corporation in 
that case had sought a judgment for money damages, but had characterized its plea as one for an 
"accounting." The Court held that this characterization did not alter the legal nature of the 
claim. 369 U.S. at 477-78. The Court also ruled that the defendant retained its right to have legal 
issues tried to a jury despite the lower court's characterization of those issues as "incidental" to 
equitable ones present in the same case. 369 U.S. at 473. 
In Ross, the Court held that a shareholders' derivative suit carried the right to a jury trial in 
certain instances. 396 U.S. at 539. Though shareholders' derivative suits had traditionally been 
considered equitable, the Court reasoned that with the advent of the Federal Rules, these cases 
could be divided into two subdivisions: (1) the stockholders' right to sue on behalf of the corpo-
ration, and (2) the corporation's claim against the defendants. The Court held that in those cases 
in which the latter claim could properly be described as "legal" the parties would be entitled to 
trial by jury. 396 U.S. at 539. 
The dissenting opinion in Ross argued that the majority was not truly determining the dispo-
sition of two separate causes of action, but rather redefining one general cause of action: the 
shareholders' derivative suit. 396 U.S. at 549 (Stewart, J., dissenting). If this description of the 
majority's reasoning were accurate, the case would stand as authority for defining "legal" causes 
of action broadly. But the majority in Ross saw itself as allocating the factfinding function be-
tween several distinct causes of action. 396 U.S. at 539. 
Therefore Ross, like Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, is not applicable to the classification 
of a new cause of action such as the statutory copyright remedy. The latter problem, in fact, is 
fundamentally different from that presented in those three cases. The question of whether a single 
new cause of action is equitable or legal cannot be resolved simply by splitting the case up. This 
question, rather, involves a determination of how to categorize one issue that may possess both 
equitable and legal characteristics. 
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tation would, however, read too much into the Court's opinions.145 
As various other Supreme Court opinions illustrate, the Court has 
been willing to narrow the scope of the seventh amendment in appro-
priate situations.146 Moreover, even if a pro-jury bias has colored the 
Court's decisions in cases involving both legal and equitable issues, 
that bias would not necessarily extend to the separate issue of classify-
ing new causes of action. 
In this limited area - categorization of new causes of action - the 
Court has been all but silent.147 Thus, a policy of defining "equity" 
broadly in such cases would violate no settled constitutional interpre-
tation. Indeed, such a policy would lend coherence to seventh amend-
ment doctrine by ameliorating some of the problems caused by the 
perpetuation of the antiquated equitable/legal distinction. 
CONCLUSION 
Parties in dispute over whether statutory copyright damages are 
legal or equitable have burdened the federal courts with numerous 
cases and many appeals. 148 As in other instances of litigation engen-
dered by the seventh amendment, however, the underlying issue is not 
really whether the cases are legal or equitable, but whether the parties 
have the right to a jury trial. 
The available evidence indicates that the statutory copyright dam-
ages remedy is properly considered equitable. But even if this result 
were not so clear, a policy of defining this and other ambiguous causes 
of action as equitable would help reduce the irrelevant arguments, and 
the irrational results, produced by an unduly broad interpretation of 
the seventh amendment. 
- Andrew W. Stumpff 
145. The Court has not argued from the premise that the seventh amendment is to be inter-
preted broadly. Rather, in these cases the Court has found that procedural barriers that had 
prevented application of the amendment have been removed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The Court has not extended the definition of what cases are to be called "legal," but 
instead has merely recognized the rules' potential for separating concededly legal claims from 
concededly equitable ones. 
146. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn,, 430 U.S. 
442 (1977) (denying right to jury trial in OSHA hearing); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) 
(denying right to jury trial in bankruptcy case). 
147. Only Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 
(1974), have touched on this issue. In passing, Ross mentioned a three-part test that deviates 
only slightly from the historical test. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text. Curlis 
stands as authority for characterizing statutory copyright damages as equitable. See notes 108-15 
supra and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., note 23 supra. 
